Abstract. One common characteristic of many Policy Support Systems (PSSs) is their dependency on the concept of hierarchy. Hierarchy does not need to be limited to a hierarchy of roles (subject centric) as in traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). Instead, it can be applied to other aspects of PSS such as object, environment, purpose and so on. In this paper, we propose a new generalized model for PSS. The model unifies Generalized Role-Based Access Control (GRBAC) and Enterprise Privacy Practices (E-P3P) policy support systems and generalizes their hierarchy semantics.
Definition of Hierarchy
A mathematical structure called hierarchy was defined by Jajodia et al. in [8] as a triple (X, Y, ≤), where X is the set of primitive entities, e.g. a user, an object; Y is the set of categories, e.g. a group, an object type; ≤ is a partial order on (X ∪ Y ) such that each x ∈ X is a minimal element of (X ∪Y ); an element x ∈ X is said to be minimal iff there are no elements below it in the hierarchy, that is iff ∀y ∈ (X ∪ Y ) : y ≤ x ⇒ y = x. This definition is rich enough to capture all hierarchy structures presented in [1, 2] . We simplify this definition of hierarchy to a two-entry tuple (Y, ≤), i.e. H = (Y, ≤) where:
• Y is the set of categories, such that a primitive entity is treated as a category of itself, called primitive category. A primitive category contains one primitive entity and the name of the category is the same as the name of the primitive entity. For example a primitive entity James Bond belongs to a primitive category called James Bond.
• ≤ is a partial order on Y such that each primitive category in Y is a minimal element of Y .
In addition, we define the following two binary relations over Y . The first binary relation < describes descendant-ancestor relationship between the elements in Y . If y i , y j ∈ Y and y i < y j , y j is said to be the ancestor of y i ; y i is said to be the descendant of y j . The relation y i < y j is interpreted as y i is in the category of y j . For an element y i , a set of all its ancestors is defined as Aset y i = {y k : y k ∈ Y and y i < y k }; a set of all its descendants is Dset y i = {y k : y k ∈ Y and y k < y i }. The second binary relation < C describes child-parent relationship between elements in Y . If y i , y j ∈ Y and y i < C y j , y j is said to be the parent of y i ; y i is said to be the child of y j . For an element y i , a set of all its parents is defined as P set yi = {y k : y k ∈ Y and y i < C y k }; a set of all its children is Cset yi = {y k : y k ∈ Y and y k < C y i }. Some of the hierarchies used in practice are listed as follows. Subject hierarchy GH = (G, ≤ G ) where G is a set of groups (roles), ≤ G defines hierarchy relationships between groups in G. Object hierarchy T H = (T, ≤ T ) where T is a set of types, ≤ T defines hierarchy relationships between types in T . Environment hierarchy EH = (E, ≤ E ) where E is a set of environments, ≤ E defines hierarchy relationships between environments in E. Purpose hierarchy P H = (P, ≤ P ) where P is a set of purposes, ≤ P defines hierarchy relationships between purposes in P .
A Generalized Model of a Policy Support System
It is common for a PSS to define more than one hierarchies. For example, GRBAC [1] defines GH, T H and EH hierarchies and E-P3P [2] defines GH, T H and P H hierarchies. Furthermore these systems define some sets of elements, such as the set of actions, the set of obligations, the set of authorization types etc. In this section, we define a generalized model which unifies GRBAC and E-P3P.
A generalized Policy Support System PSS = (H, S, A, R, P), where:
• H denotes a set of n hierarchies H 1 , ..., H n , n ≥ 1.
• S is a set of m sets S 1 , ..., S m , where m ≥ 0. The sets defined in S provide additional restrictions on PSS; for example the sets of obligations and conditions in E-P3P system are instances of such sets. S is optional and its existence depends on the designer of a PSS, e.g. in GRBAC S is absent.
• A is a set of actions to be performed on data.
• R is a set of authorization types (rulings). R = {+, −, ⊕, , , ⊗}, where + means positive authorization; − means negative authorization; ⊕ means implicit positive authorization; means implicit negative authorization; means authorization pending and ⊗ means no authorization. + and − are used for explicit authorization assignment through policy rules; ⊕ and are used for authorization propagation; is used for conflicts resolution; ⊗ is used when none of the above five rulings is applicable.
• P is a set of precedences over policy rules. P = Z, i.e. P is the set of integers that determines precedence orders over a set of policy rules; the greater number denotes the higher precedence. P is also optional; the absence of P means that all policy rules have the same precedence.
The elements of the above five parts are used as basic units to form policy rules. The collection of all the policy rules in a PSS is a policy rule set, denoted as Γ . A policy rule γ ∈ Γ is a tuple (γ H1 , ..., γ Hn , γ S1 , ..., γ Sm , γ A , γ R , γ P ) where
• γ A ∈ A is the action entry that specifies the action to be performed.
• γ R ∈ {+, −} is the ruling entry that specifies either positive or negative authorization.
• γ P ∈ P is the precedence of γ.
It is possible to show that the model defined above "includes" GRBAC [1] and E-P3P [2] . A GRBAC system is a triple (H, A, R), where H = {GH, T H, EH} (GH is subject hierarchy, T H is object hierarchy and EH is environment hierarchy). A GRBAC policy rule [1] is a tuple (S, O, E, op, permission bit), where S ∈ GH, O ∈ T H, E ∈ EH, op ∈ A and permission bit ∈ {+, −}. There is no precedence over GRBAC policy rules, hence the set P is absent. An E-P3P system is a tuple (H, S, A, R, P), where H = {GH, T H, P H}, S = {O, C} (GH is subject hierarchy, T H is object hierarchy, P H is purpose hierarchy, O is the set of obligations and C is the set of conditions). An E-P3P policy rule [2] is a tuple (i, t, p, u, r, a, o, c) ,
According to the definition of a policy rule, an access request α can be expressed
A set of policy rules Γ α is used to validate α, where Γ α ⊆ Γ . All policy rules in Γ α are called matching rules of α. Matching rules must satisfy the following properties:
The validation of α in Γ α consists of n sub-validations from α H 1 to α H n . That is, ∀α H i ∈ α where n ≥ i ≥ 1, α H i needs to be validated according to the matching rule set Γ α whether α H i is authorized for α A . If and only if all of these hierarchy elements are authorized for α A , α is granted.
An authorization of an element y ∈ H is a tuple (ruling, precedence) inside which ruling ∈ R, precedence ∈ P; it is denoted as A 
Here is an example of assigning explicit authorizations, assume
When an element of a hierarchy has more than one inequable authorizations, conflicts arise. Our system provides methods of conflicts resolution, called authorization precedence policy. In our system, conflicts can be solved either manually or automatically. For a hierarchy
If an element y ∈ M R i has authorization conflicts, we assign y with the authorization ( , ). In this case, the decision of the access request α that causes the conflicts will be pending until the conflicts are manually solved by SSO. If an element y ∈ Y i \ M R i has authorization conflicts, these conflicts are solved automatically by the following rules.
• authorizations are with the highest precedence; ⊗ authorizations are with the lowest precedence. There are no maximum and minimum integers in Z, hence the precedence entries of these two types of authorizations are absent. An authorization with higher precedence overrides authorizations with lower precedences.
• If the precedences are the same, denies-take-precedence will apply. The priority order is: −, , +, ⊕. An authorization with higher priority order overrides authorizations with lower priority orders.
Our authorization precedence policy is very flexible. Authorization pending gives SSO opportunities to review authorization conflicts. By doing that, SSO may find bugs of Γ and give user better response. After we perform all authorization derivations and conflicts resolutions on H i , H i 's final authorization state is obtained, where ∀y ∈ H i , y has a final authorization F A y that is not conflicting. The result of the sub-validation of α Hi is F A α H i .ruling. The decision of α is processed as follows.
• If α is not denied and ∃F A α H i .ruling = , then α is pending.
Hierarchy Semantics of GRBAC and E-P3P
Hierarchy semantics defines rules of authorization propagation. In this section, the hierarchy semantics of GRBAC and E-P3P is depicted.
Hierarchy Semantics of GRBAC
The hierarchy semantics in GRBAC [1] 
Fig. 1. Example object hierarchy T H
An example below illustrates the hierarchy semantics of GRBAC. Consider the object hierarchy T H shown in figure 1 ; there are 9 elements in T H, among which jingle.mp3 (y 8 ) is a primitive category that is a child of classified file (y 4 ) and MP3 file (y 7 ). Now there is an access request α from user u (we assume u is y 6 in GH) to read jingle.mp3 (T H.y 8 ) under environment e (we assume e is y 1 in EH), i.e. α = (GH.y 6 , T H.y 8 , EH.y 1 , read). The policy rule set Γ = {γ 1 , γ 2 }; γ 1 = (GH.y 6 , T H.y 4 , EH.y 1 , read, +), γ 2 = (GH.y 6 , T H.y 7 , EH.y 1 , read, +). Obviously, the matching rule set Γ α = Γ . According to GRBAC hierarchy semantics, we can derive that u can read jingle.mp3 if standard or lenient permission inheritance is applied; u cannot read it if strict permission inheritance is applied.
The original intention of strict permission inheritance is to restrict accesses to the elements in the category of sensitive/vulnerable categories defined by SSO. GRBAC's strict permission inheritance is trying to fulfill this intention. However this definition is too strict to be practical. In the example above, user u is explicitly authorized to read both classified file and MP3 file and there is no policy rule disallow these accesses (as shown in the example Γ above). In this case, even if we are very strict, user u should have read access to jingle.mp3, which is a child of classified file and MP3 file. GRBAC will deny this access because GRBAC's strict permission inheritance requires the requested element and all its ancestors to be explicitly authorized for the access; obviously this is too strict. If a system deploys this strict permission inheritance, few access requests can be granted.
Hierarchy Semantics of E-P3P
In E-P3P, an access request α is processed in the following two steps [2] . The first step creates a set of preliminary authorization rules P A; P A is a rule set defined as the union of Γ and DΓ , where DΓ contains all rules derived from Γ by using the hierarchy semantics defined in this system. The second step processes access request α according to P A.
The hierarchy semantics of E-P3P is defined as follows [2]:
• Down-inheritance: For each rule (i, t, p, u, r, a, o, c i, t, p, u, −, a, o, c) ∈ P A, for every (t , p , u ) such that t ≤ T t , p ≤ P p , and u ≤ G u , a tuple (i, t , p , u −, a, o, c) is added to P A.
In this system, if contradicting policy rules coexist, denies-take-precedence will be applied to remove contradicting policy rules with lower precedences from P A.
We can identify two problems existing in this system. The first problem is that the concept of permission inheritance is omitted. As a consequence, the system is not flexible in practice. For example, it provides no mechanism for enforcing strict permission inheritance. The second problem is that the definition of up-inheritance of deny is reasonless. The first problem is apparent; here we will give an example that reveals the second problem. Following the semantics of up-inheritance of deny, some reasonable requests from users are denied. Let us consider the following scenario. There is a primitive category BMW ad.wav (T H.y 9 in figure 1 ) in the category of multimedia (T H.y 2 in figure 1) , besides we assume that GH.y 6 is user u and P H.y 3 is a purpose. There are two policy rules in Γ , i.e. Γ = {γ 1 , γ 2 }; γ 1 = (1, T H.y 7 , P H.y 3 , GH.y 6 , −, read, null, null), γ 2 = (1, T H.y 2 , P H.y 3 , GH.y 6 , +, read, null, null). Now there is an access request from user u: α = (T H.y 9 , P H.y 3 , GH.y 6 , read, null, null); i.e. user u requests to read BMW ad.wav for the purpose of P H.y 3 with no specified condition and obligation. Because T H.y 7 ≤ T T H.y 2 (see figure 1) , P H.y 3 ≤ P P H.y 3 and GH.y 6 ≤ G GH.y 6 , following up-inheritance of deny, there will be a policy rule γ 3 derived from γ 1 : γ 3 = (1, T H.y 2 , P H.y 3 , GH.y 6 , −, read, null, null), that is user u is not allowed to read multimedia for the purpose of P H.y 3 . Then P A = Γ ∪ {γ 3 }, i.e. P A = {γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 } (here we skip other derived rules). The two policy rules γ 2 and γ 3 are contradicting policy rules. Because of denies-take-precedence, the rule γ 2 will be removed from P A, now P A = {γ 1 , γ 3 }. The system will validate α according to P A = {γ 1 , γ 3 }, hence according to γ 3 , user u's request α is denied.
Solution
This section presents the hierarchy semantics defined in our generalized PSS. The semantics described below eliminates the problems mentioned in section 4 and extends the hierarchy semantics of GRBAC and E-P3P.
Hierarchy Semantics
Our interpretation of the concept of hierarchy is such that the relationship between a descendant element and its ancestor element is in the category of. The common rationale is that when an authorization is applied on an ancestor element (superior category), this authorization may also be applied to its descendant elements (inferior categories) implicitly. As a consequence, authorizations propagate downwards ( and ⊗ authorizations do not propagate; the term authorization in this sub-section denotes authorizations other than and ⊗ authorizations). We only consider authorization propagations between parents and children here; any complex authorization propagation is an aggregation of such simple propagations. In a hierarchy, two different types of elements must be clearly distinguished. Pure element is an element that has only one parent; hybrid element is an element that has more than one parents. Based on these two types of elements, two different situations of down-propagation of authorizations can be identified.
• If a child is a pure element, all authorizations of its parent propagate down.
• If a child is a hybrid element, the hierarchy semantics is complicated. There are many options that represent different strictness of authorization propagation. These options are listed as follows.
(a) Strict down-propagation: SSO defines a combination of elements called Strict Combination (SC). For a child y, if ∃y j ∈ P set y such that y j ∈ SC, then the authorization propagation from y's parents to y will follow the semantics of strict down-propagation. We define a set SC y = {y i : y i ∈ P set y and y i ∈ SC}. The semantics of strict down-propagation is as follows. i. All (implicit) negative authorizations of elements in P set y \SC y propagate down to y; all other authorizations of elements in P set y propagate down to y iff ∀y i ∈ SC y such that F A yi .ruling = + (or ⊕). (b) Lenient down-propagation: SSO defines a combination of elements called Lenient Combination (LC). For a child y, if ∃y j ∈ P set y such that y j ∈ LC and ¬∃y k ∈ P set y such that y k ∈ SC (for security concern, strict downpropagation overrides lenient down-propagation), then the authorization propagation from y's parents to y will follow the semantics of lenient down-propagation. We define a set LC y = {y i : y i ∈ P set y and y i ∈ LC}. The semantics of lenient down-propagation is as follows. i. If ¬∃y i ∈ LC y such that F A y i .ruling = + (or ⊕), all authorizations of elements in P set y propagate down to y. ii. If ∃y i ∈ LC y such that F A yi .ruling = + (or ⊕), all authorizations of elements in {y k : y k ∈ P set y and F A y k .ruling = + (or ⊕)} propagate down to y. (c) Standard down-propagation: For a child y, if ¬∃y j ∈ P set y such that y j ∈ LC and ¬∃y k ∈ P set v such that y k ∈ SC, then the authorization propagation from y's parents to y will follow the semantics of standard down-propagation. The semantics of standard down-propagation is as follows. i. All authorizations of y's parents propagate down to y.
The semantics described above generalizes the hierarchy semantics in GRBAC and E-P3P.The strict permission inheritance defined in GRBAC (section 4.1) is a special case of our definition of strict down-propagation where ∀y i ∈ P set y , y i ∈ SC. The lenient permission inheritance defined in GRBAC (section 4.1) is a special case of our definition of lenient down-propagation where ∀y i ∈ P set y , y i ∈ LC. The proposed hierarchy semantics also eliminates the questionable semantics in GRBAC and E-P3P. If our strict down-propagation is applied in the examples shown in section 4.1 and section 4.2, the reasonable access requests will be approved. The semantics of up-inheritance of deny (section 4.2) is incorrect; hence in our hierarchy semantics it is not included.
Scenarios of the Use of Hierarchy Semantics
This section shows some examples of using the hierarchy semantics defined in this paper. In these examples, we assume authorization conflicts are resolved automatically. Due to limited space, the examples of down-propagation to a pure element and standard down-propagation are not included in this paper. In the second example, a primitive category Jack s credit history (y 3 ) enters two categories: sensitive information (y 1 ) and private information (y 2 ). SSO wants to be strict to accesses to elements entering y 1 or y 2 . SSO defines SC = {y 1 , y 2 }. Because F A y1 .ruling = + and F A y2 .ruling = +, F A y1 and F A y2 propagate down to y 3 . After conflict resolution, F A y 3 = (⊕, 2). An example of lenient down-propagation is shown in figure 3 . SSO wants to be lenient to those who are allowed to access emergency information (y 1 ), because emergency information is often related to vital event. SSO defines LC = {y 1 } and we assume SC = ∅. Then even if the other parent y 2 of patient allergic history (y 3 ) is denied access, y 3 is still accessible to those who are allowed to access y 1 .
Conclusion and Future Work
PSSs are capable of expressing and enforcing rich data protection policies. GRBAC and E-P3P are representatives of such systems. In GRBAC and E-P3P, hierarchy is an important and widely used concept. Being an inseparable part of hierarchy, hierarchy semantics defines rules of authorization propagation. In this paper, we have proposed a generalized PSS that covers GRBAC and E-P3P. Based on this generalized PSS, we analyze the hierarchy semantics used in GRBAC and E-P3P. We point out errors and limitations of GRBAC and E-P3P hierarchy semantics. Finally, we present new hierarchy semantics to address the problems discovered.
In the future, the following research work interests us:
• finding more useful hierarchy semantics.
• investigating efficient access request processing mechanisms.
• reviewing other related work such as access control for XML document etc.
